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Abstract
McCallum (1995) shows in an inﬂuential contribution that, even when controlling for the
impact of bilateral distance and the region size, borders sharply reduce trade volumes between
countries. We use in this paper data on bilateral trade ﬂows between 94 French regions, for
10 industries and 2 years (1978 and 1993) to study the magnitude and variations over time of
trade impediments, both distance-related and (administrative) border-related. We focus on
assessing the role that business and social networks can play in shaping trade patterns and
explaining the border eﬀect puzzle.
Using a structural econometric approach, we show that intra-national administrative bor-
ders signiﬁcantly aﬀect trade patterns inside France. The impact is of the same order of
magnitude as in Wolf (2000) for trade inside the United States. We show that more than 60%
of these (puzzling) intra-national border eﬀects can be explained by the composition of local
labour force in terms of birth place (social networks) and by inter-plants connections (business
networks). In addition, controlling for these network eﬀects reduces the impact of transport
cost on trade ﬂows by a comparable factor. Thus, business and social networks that help
reduce informational trade barriers are shown to be strong determinants of trade patterns and
to explain a large part of the border puzzle.
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It is one of the most widely accepted ﬁnding in international economics that distance matters in
shaping the volumes of bilateral trade between nations. Trade ﬂows fall with distance as shown
by the myriad of papers using the gravity model.
A more recent ﬁnding, initiated by the work of McCallum (1995) is that, in addition to the
impact of distance, borders seem to sharply reduce trade: For equal sizes and distances, regions
trade much more between themselves if they are not separated by a national border. The initial
work focuses on trade of Canadian provinces and the magnitude of that “border eﬀect” can be
summarized as following: Intra-national trade exceed international trade by a factor of about 20
in 1988 for given bilateral distance and size of regions. Several studies inspired by this ﬁrst paper
replicate the exercise for other countries and other periods (Wei, 1996, Helliwell, 1996 and 1997,
Nitsch, 2000, Head and Mayer, 2000). The eﬀect was found to be quite comparable across samples
and always surprisingly large, so large that Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) refer to the border eﬀect
as one of the “six major puzzles in international macroeconomics”. Explaining this puzzle is now
an important question in the research agenda as the estimated border eﬀects in the literature
represent a challenge to our view about the current level of trade integration.1 The purpose of
this paper is to contribute to the search of possible reasons explaining why borders still matter
so much in trade.
The reasons why distance matters in international trade can be related to transaction costs,
consisting mainly of transport costs, incurred when shipping a good. Distance is also related to
the time elapsed before delivering the good, which represents additional costs when the product
is perishable in nature or looses value after a short period of time2. Distance between countries is
also correlated with the strength of cultural and informational linkages between them and those
links have been shown to be important in bilateral trade volumes (see Rauch, 2001, for a review
on this topic).
The reasons why borders still matter even when controlling for distance is more problematic.
The literature has, to date, focused on four major explanations:
1. The ﬁrst explanation is technical. Borders might appear to matter in trade because the
estimated equation is mis-speciﬁed and/or the covariates used are imprecisely measured or
badly constructed. The model speciﬁcation explanation has been recently investigated by
Anderson and Van Wincoop (forthcoming), whose work shows that estimating structural
parameters from the theoretical gravity equation can reduce border eﬀects. Head and Mayer
(2002) focus on how mismeasurement in distances can also inﬂate the estimated border eﬀect
and propose a theory-based distance variable that reduces the estimated impact of borders.
2. The second and perhaps most straightforward explanation has to do with protection. If
the countries in the sample considered still have signiﬁcant (and not controlled for) formal
barriers to trade such as tariﬀs or non tariﬀ barriers, then the impact of those trade imped-
iments is going to show up as a negative eﬀect of the border on trade ﬂows. Wolf (1997 and
2000) was the ﬁrst to provide an indirect empirical test for the validity of the trade barriers
explanation. The idea is that if national border eﬀects are related to trade barriers, then
those border eﬀects should vanish when considering trade between and within regions inside
1Wolf (2000) for instance states in his conclusion that “The next research challenge is to further explore the
causes of home bias” (p.561).
2Hummels (2001) and Evans and Harrigan (2002) provide estimates of the importance of time as a trade barrier.
1a country. For that purposes, he uses trade ﬂows between and within American states where
the “standard” trade barriers are absent. He ﬁnds that US states borders have an impact
that is less important than for international trade but still not negligible, suggesting that
there exists a minimal level of market fragmentation even within a nation as integrated as
the United States.
3. Transaction costs due to the use of diﬀerent currencies have recently been proposed as a
plausible explanation. The seemingly robust (although controversial) ﬁnding of Rose (2000)
that monetary unions would triple bilateral trade ﬂows, provides a potential cause for trade
border eﬀects. The fact that nations are almost by deﬁnition monetary unions could explain
the seemingly excessive trade taking place inside their borders. Parsley and Wei (2001) and
Taglioni (2001) provide some empirical support for this hypothesis, showing that exchange
rate volatility explains a signiﬁcant part of the border eﬀect.
4. A last possible explanation has to do with home bias in consumer or ﬁrm preferences, which
would lead to the following plausible explanation to the impact of borders: People may have
a higher valuation for the goods produced locally simply because they are more familiar
with them or because of “chauvinism”. This increases the demand for these goods and
consequently the observed intra-regional ﬂows. In addition to the eﬀect of distance, this
creates a signiﬁcant discontinuous drop in the ﬂows when they cross the border. These
Armington (1969) type home biased preferences can be easily introduced in monopolistic
competition models to derive a structural speciﬁcation of the gravity theory including border
eﬀects.
We propose in this paper a diﬀerent explanation of border eﬀects based on informational
trade barriers. A recent strand of the literature surveyed by Rauch (2001) suggests that business
and social networks operating across borders might help to alleviate some information problems
and thus promote trade. Informational barriers make it diﬃcult both for consumers to obtain
relevant information on the goods produced abroad, and for foreign producers to learn the tastes
of consumers or ﬁnd eﬃcient local retailers. Both mechanisms increase the transaction costs,
and therefore the price of foreign goods, which has a negative impact on trade ﬂows. Rauch
(2001) also details how the reciprocal knowledge of trade partners reduces costly “opportunism”
in business, networks being substitutes for contract enforcement laws, since “establishment of a
moral community and collective punishment of cheaters are not mutually exclusive mechanisms for
discouraging opportunistic behavior” (p. 1182). Empirical evidence in this direction is provided
through the trade-creating eﬀect of migrations (Gould, 1994, Head and Ries, 1998, Wagner et al.,
2002) and business groups operating across national borders (Rauch and Trindade, 2002). We
propose in this paper that the same mechanisms can contribute to explain why borders matter in
shaping regional trade ﬂows. We argue that these eﬀects are not totally proportional to distance
but would reduce trade ﬂows in a discrete way, at the crossing of the borders.3 Including business
and social networks variables is shown to indeed reduce border eﬀects. Finally, and in contrast to
purely technical or exogenous explanations of border eﬀects, our argument has important policy
implications. For instance, increased mobility of ﬁrms and people in Europe may have a strong
positive impact on trade ﬂows through the reduction of the discrete negative impact of borders
they induce.
All proposed explanations for the puzzle might of course play simultaneously, and disentan-
gling them is a crucial step towards understanding which explanations are truly relevant. Our
3Note that Rauch (2001) opens his survey with a paragraph stating how border eﬀects in trade can be explained
by informational barriers.
2work proceeds by neutralizing some possible explanations.
First, in order to try and neutralize the “technical” explanations of border eﬀects, our esti-
mated speciﬁcation is rigorously derived from a monopolistic competition model of trade allowing
for home biased preferences. This strongly links our estimations to the theoretical predictions.
Moreover, we pay particular attention to the measurement and speciﬁcation of the transaction
cost and we make a clear distinction between its transport and information components. Second,
we follow Wolf (2000) and focus on trade within a country, which cancels any possibility of trade
policy eﬀects as well as the monetary union explanation.
More precisely, we study border eﬀects for 94 French administrative regions (“d´ epartements”)
and use data on trade ﬂows at the industry level (10 industries) and for two years (1978 and 1993).
We also beneﬁt from a precise measure of inter-regional transport costs. We can therefore study
the integration of French market over time and analyse the border eﬀects for diﬀerent industries.
We then investigate whether the remaining estimated border eﬀect within France can be
related to business and social networks. To that purpose, trade ﬂows between two regions are
related to the number of people working in a region who were born in the other. These bilateral
stocks of migrants within France capture social networks. As emphasized by Rauch (2001), a large
number of migrants from another area tends to promote trade because they keep active linkages
with their networks at “home”: “Immigrants know the characteristics of many domestic buyers
and sellers and carry this knowledge abroad” (p.1184). Another explanation relies on the fact
that migrants bring (at least partly) their tastes with them: “...the impact on bilateral trade of
immigrants [...] reﬂect[s] immigrant taste for goods from their countries of origin” (p.1185). Gould
(1994) also underlines that “the development of trust through immigrant contacts can decrease
the costs associated with negotiating trade contracts and ensuring their enforcement”. Besides
social networks, Rauch (2001) claims that “foreign direct investment by one or more members of
a domestic business has the same eﬀect [as the migrant eﬀects]” (p.1185). He also details more
subtle eﬀects of barriers to entry and collusion inside business groups strongly aﬀecting trade
patterns. Thus, we also consider these business networks by including in our set of explanatory
variables the number of plants of each region that have a plant belonging to the same group4 in
the other region.
Our results show that administrative borders within France do indeed have a negative impact
on trade. Our baseline estimates show that trade is in 1993 around six times lower between
two non-contiguous regions than inside a region, for given size and distance. This magnitude
is of the same order as results by Wolf (2000) for the United States. We ﬁnd that the impact
of borders declines over time, thus matching the trend over more economic integration within
France. Importantly, we show that a substantial part, higher than 60%, of the trade border eﬀect
can be explained by both social and business networks. Finally, an industry-level analysis allows
us to assess the relative importance of the network eﬀects across sectors.
Before proceeding with structural econometrics, we present a graphical representation for
three diﬀerent samples (US states, European countries, and French regions), which is maybe
the clearest way to present the twin eﬀects of distance and borders on trade. Let mij denote
the imports of location i from location j, dij the distance between the two, and Yi the GDP in
location i. The gravity model is, in its simplest form,
mij = GYiYj (dij)
¡" ; (1)
4A group has a larger deﬁnition than a ﬁrm. For instance, all plants of Peugeot and Citro¨ en belong to the same
group called PSA.
3where " is a positive parameter and G is a constant. A convenient way to represent equation (1)





against ln(dij). The result for the three diﬀerent samples is represented in
Figure 1.
The top graph in this ﬁgure uses a sample very close to the one used by Wolf (2000), that
is, bilateral trade ﬂows between and within US states in 1997 (Wolf used the 1993 data). The
estimated coeﬃcient for the distance is " = 1:15 (R2 = 0:61). The second one uses the sample
in Head and Mayer (2000), that is bilateral trade ﬂows between and within European countries
in 1993. The estimated coeﬃcient for the distance is " = 1:42 (R2 = 0:58). Last, the third
one uses the original sample of this paper, that is bilateral trade ﬂows (in volume) between
and within French d´ epartements in 1993. The estimated coeﬃcient for the distance is " = 1:73
(R2 = 0:62). In each of those panels, the circles represent ﬂows between locations, and triangles
represent ﬂows within locations. We immediately can see that “internal ﬂows” are much higher
than the gravity prediction represented by the continuous straight line: Even accounting for
the fact that ﬂows inside a geographical unit cover a much lower distance than ﬂows across
geographical units, internal trade observations are large positive outliers in the gravity equation,
which econometrically translates into the border eﬀect for the three samples.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, a theoretical model of trade under
monopolistic competition is presented, in which business and social network eﬀects work through
transaction costs and heterogeneous tastes. This yields a directly estimable equation that bears
some strong links with the gravity equation but is augmented such as making all variables justiﬁed
by the theoretical model. The data we use are described at the end of section 2. Section 3 presents
the estimations results and section 4 concludes.
2 A Model of home bias in national trade
We describe in this section the theoretical underpinnings of the speciﬁcation of border and network
eﬀects we use. This modelling is inspired by the widely used trade model of monopolistic com-
petition ` a la Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977, Krugman, 1980), slightly modiﬁed
to account for home bias in the consumers’ preferences.
2.1 Consumption
The representative consumer’s utility in region i depends upon the consumption cijh of all varieties
h produced in any region j. Varieties are diﬀerentiated with a constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) but they do not enter symmetrically the utility function: A speciﬁc weight, aij, is attached
to all varieties imported from region j. Let nj denote the number of varieties produced in region
















where ¾ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution. Let mij denote the c.i.f. value of imports of region i
from region j and pij the delivered price in region i of any variety produced in region j. Denoting
by ¿ij the iceberg-type ad-valorem equivalent transaction cost between regions i and j and pj the
mill price in j, we have
pij = (1 + ¿ij)pj: (3)
4Figure 1: Distance and Borders in Trade
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5It is then straightforward to obtain the following demand function, where mi =
P
k mik is
the whole expenditure of region i on the diﬀerentiated good varieties imported from all possible










The numerator of equation (4) links the bilateral ﬂow to the size of the demand expressed
by region i (mi), the size of the considered industry in region j (nj), the bilateral preference





There are two major problems that remain to be solved in order to get an estimable equation.
We must ﬁrst deal with Pi which complicates estimation by introducing non linearity in unknown
parameters. To do that, we use a convenient feature emphasized in Anderson et al. (1992) of CES
demand functions, often called Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)6 due to the similarity
with the logit model. In this type of demand functional form, the ratio of two bilateral trade
ﬂows to a same importing country depends only on the characteristics of the two corresponding
exporting countries. Therefore it proves convenient to divide all bilateral trade ﬂows by “imports















The second estimation problem relies on the fact that the number of varieties produced in
region j, nj, and the delivered prices, pij, are not observed. It is possible, however, to use the
behavior of producers under monopolistic competition to get a correspondence with variables
easier to observe, as regional production, wage, and transaction cost.
2.2 Production
As usual in this type of model, diﬀerentiation costs are considered suﬃciently low to ensure
that each variety is produced by a single ﬁrm. The production of each variety is subject to
increasing returns to scale with a common technology among regions. Labor is the only input.
Let f (g, respectively) denote the ﬁxed (marginal, respectively) labor requirement for production,
independent on the region. The needed quantity of labor in region j to produce a quantity qj of
a representative variety is therefore lj = gqj + f. If wj denotes the wage rate in region j, the
corresponding proﬁt function is
¼j = pjqj ¡ wj(gqj + f): (6)
The Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model of monopolistic competition assumes that ﬁrms are too
small to have a sizeable impact on the overall price index and on the regional income. This
implies that the ﬁrst order condition with respect to price gives a constant markup over marginal
cost
5Note that, with a production function ` a la Ethier (1982), demand for inputs takes the same form, which is
important as many industries we focus on are mainly producing inputs for other industries.
6See, however, Lai and Treﬂer (2002) or Anderson and van Wincoop (forthcoming) for diﬀerent approaches to
the same issue involving non linear estimation techniques.






Consequently, all varieties produced in region j have the same mill price. It is then straight-
forward to determine the equilibrium output of each ﬁrm, resulting from the free entry of ﬁrms





Hence, since we assume that ﬁrms share a common technology, they all have the same equi-
librium output in all regions.
Let vj denote the value of the total production in region j, we get vj = njpjqj. Therefore,







By the deﬁnition of the delivered prices (3) and using the pricing rule (7), equation (5) can

















2.3 The estimable speciﬁcations
In order to obtain an estimable speciﬁcation, the ﬁnal steps involve specifying the transaction
cost (¿ij) and the preference structure of consumers (aij).
We consider two diﬀerent elements in the transaction cost: Physical transport costs, Tij and
information costs, Iij. According to Gould (1994) and Rauch (2001), these information costs
are ﬁrst due to the fact that ﬁrms are not perfectly aware of the consumers’ preferences and
devote resources to acquire this information. Second, producers are not perfectly connected to
(or have not perfect information on) the trade intermediaries that locally sell the goods to the
consumers (households or ﬁrms). For instance, they are not aware of the location of stores or
are not connected with the local retailers. All of these increase the transaction cost. Hence, we
assume
1 + ¿ij = TijIij: (11)
For the transport cost, we assume the following structure
Tij = (1 + tij)± exp(¡µ(1 + tij)2); (12)
where tij is the measure of transport cost between i and j we use. It incorporates both distance
and time related elements of this cost. Parameters ± and µ are expected to be positive. In this
case, this cost function embodies a standard feature of increasing returns in transport activities:
The cost associated with transport reduces equilibrium trade ﬂows, but the marginal cost of
shipping a good decreases with distance.
For the information cost, we assume
7Iij = (1 + sij)¡®I(1 + sji)¡¯I(1 + bij)¡°I(1 + bji)¡½I exp('IAij ¡ ÃICij): (13)
Aij and Cij are dummy variables set to 1 when i is diﬀerent from j, and when i and j are
diﬀerent but correspond to contiguous regions, respectively. We assume that the best information
from which producers beneﬁt corresponds to the market where they are located. Next, we consider
two diﬀerent geographic levels in the transmission of information. Our hypothesis is that the
informational transaction cost is lower inside a region than between two non contiguous regions
(Aij), but higher between those than between two contiguous regions (Cij).
Following the terminology used by Rauch (2001), we refer to the eﬀects of sij and sji as social
networks, and to the eﬀects of bij and bji as business networks. sij and sji contain information
costs related to the diﬃculty of establishing social networks between i and j. bij and bji are the
corresponding variables intended to capture information ﬂowing between i and j through business
networks. Thus, we assume that producers in region j obtain some information on region i market
thanks to the people employed in j that were born in i. For instance, these workers know where
are located the region i consumers or retailers. We assume that this eﬀect is larger, the larger
the number of such workers in the region, and we use the variable sji to reﬂect that. Conversely,
the higher the number of people in region i who were born in region j, the higher the probability
that they act as importers for the region j producers, or that they are still connected to them
and transmit some information on region i markets. This is the reason why we also introduce
sij. Another reason for introducing these variables is the “opportunism” argument developed
by Rauch (2001) and presented in the introduction, which also works both ways. When people
know each other and belong to the same network, there is less need for using strong and costly
contracts to protect both trading partners, which may be true for the network of people born in
the same region. Note that the speciﬁcation chosen by Gould (1994) also implies the presence of
both variables we use, even if he only considers sji, having no data on sij.
We also consider by bij and bji the links between plants belonging to the same group. Clearly,
mechanisms of the same nature as for employees may apply. Plants of region j have more
information on the markets of region i where plants belonging to the same group are located
(bji), and, the higher the number of these plants, the higher the probability of gathering such
information (bij). Opportunistic behaviors should moreover be reduced between plants belonging
to the same group. According to these intuitions, parameters ®I, ¯I, °I, ½I, 'I, and ÃI are
expected to be positive.
Consumers are assumed to have both deterministic and stochastic elements in their prefer-
ences, aij. We assume systematic preferences for local goods (produced in the region of consump-
tion), for the goods produced in a contiguous region, and for the goods produced in the region
where the consumer is born. This last eﬀect is assumed to be increasing with the sij variable.
Conversely, the higher the number of employees in region j born in region i, sji, the higher the
probability the ﬁrms in region j produce goods corresponding to region i consumers’ preferences
on which they have more information: This corresponds to a higher aij. Comparable arguments
apply for the plants, the reason why we also introduce the bij and bji variables here. Last, the
random component in the preferences is denoted eij. Thus, ®a, ¯a, °a, ½a, 'a, and Ãa being
parameters that are expected to be positive, we assume that
aij = (1 + sij)®a(1 + sji)¯a(1 + bij)°a(1 + bji)½a exp[eij ¡ 'aAij + ÃaCij]: (14)
Note that even if these variables play on both the preferences and the information part of the
transaction cost, their eﬀects are fundamentally diﬀerent in both cases. In the former case, they
8correspond to exogenous eﬀects directly aﬀecting the consumers’ preferences. In the latter case,
they correspond to endogenous demand eﬀects working in equilibrium only through the delivered
price that depends on the transaction cost.
Replacing in equation (10) the diﬀerent speciﬁcations we assume for the transaction cost (equa-
tions 11 to 13) and the preferences (equation 14), and using the notations x ´ ¾xI + (¾ ¡ 1)xa,













































¡'Aij + ÃCij + ²ij: (15)
Unfortunately, not all structural parameters are identiﬁable. The information eﬀects in the
transaction cost cannot be distinguished from the preferences eﬀects in ®, ¯, °, ½, ', and Ã.
Thus, we estimate the total eﬀect of each network variable, but not the separate eﬀects working
through preferences or transaction costs. ²ij = (¾ ¡ 1)(eij ¡ eii) implies that errors are not
independently distributed. This correlation is accounted for in the estimation through a robust
clustering procedure, allowing for residuals of observations of a same importing region to be
correlated.
Finally, note that the theoretical framework predicts Á = 1. Á is a parameter introduced in
order to give additional ﬂexibility in the estimations. The results are virtually unaﬀected by this
change to the model.8
We also estimate an alternative speciﬁcation of the theoretical model, following Head and Ries
(2001), which goes one step further in using the IIA property of the CES. The inverse “friction”








Using equation (15), we obtain what we call the friction speciﬁcation:
ln(Φij) = ¡¾± ln
0
@ 1 + tij q
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!
¡'Aij + ÃCij + "ij: (17)
The friction speciﬁcation has the advantage of being compatible with the strict version of the
model implying Á = 1. Importantly, it does not require data on regional values of production
(vi) and wages (wi), which is a noticeable advantage considering the measurement errors and
missing values often found in those series. A drawback of this setting is that less parameters
can be identiﬁed than with the odds speciﬁcation (15). Only ¾±, ¾µ, ® + ¯, ° + ½, ', and Ã
8Estimations under the constraint that Á = 1 are available upon request.
9are identiﬁable. On the other hand, border eﬀects are still identiﬁable and hence they can be
compared to those obtained with the odds speciﬁcation. Such comparisons are also possible for
the products ¾± and ¾µ and for the sums of the social (®+¯) and business (°+½) network eﬀects.
Again, the autocorrelation introduced by the fact that "ij = 1
2(²ij + ²ji) is taken into account in
estimation.
Speciﬁcations (15) and (17) are the two estimated equations in section (3). In each case, we
estimate two borders eﬀects. The total border eﬀect corresponds to exp('). It corresponds to the
ratio of intra-regional trade over inter-regional trade for non contiguous regions. The local border
eﬀect is given by exp('¡Ã). It corresponds to the ratio of intra-regional trade over inter-regional
trade for contiguous regions.
2.4 Data
The data needed consist of trade ﬂows, regional production and wages, transport costs and
bilateral measures of social and business networks.
Trade ﬂows between and inside regions available for 1978 and 1993 come from the French
Ministry of Transports database on industrial commodity ﬂows. The source and construction
method of these data are comparable to the U.S. Commodity Flow Survey (CFS) used in Wolf
(2000) and Anderson and van Wincoop (forthcoming) for instance. They are available at a very
detailed industry level. However, the observation number being sometimes low for some industries,
we either fully aggregate the ﬂows over all industries, or distinguish between 10 diﬀerent industry
aggregates. This trade ﬂow dataset suﬀers from the same imperfection as the CFS concerning
break loading and the way it treats ﬁnal destination when the latter is a foreign country, and
reciprocally for imports. While both database try to sort out ﬂows that are only in transit in a
region, a large amount of shipments to and from major ports is admitted to be in reality transit
shipments. As a consequence, the corresponding region appears to be an excessive source of ﬂows
to other regions compared to their real production (and reciprocally as a destination). Using local
GDPs as a proxy for regional production, vi in equation (15), therefore yields an underestimated
coeﬃcient on this variable, even if it does not fundamentally aﬀect the other variable eﬀects.9
We therefore use a diﬀerent method for calculating the regional production. It is computed as
the sum of the ﬂows departing from the region, including the own region internal ﬂow.
The theoretical model requires the use of a measure of transport costs between and within
French regions. Whereas most studies investigating trade determinants use distance as a proxy
for those costs, we follow a recent trend in the literature that uses newly available data on actual
transport costs (see for instance Hummels, 1999, Lim˜ ao and Venables, 2001, or Combes and
Lafourcade 2001). Our dataset for 1978 and 1993 provides the cost for a truck to join pairs of
French regions. The calculation of this cost is based on the real road network. This is a generalized
transport cost in the sense that it includes both a cost per kilometer (gas, tolls,...) depending on
the road type and a time opportunity cost (drivers’ wages, insurance,...). This measure therefore
accounts for distance-related and time-related components of transport costs, the latter being
shown to be very important by Hummels (2001). As an implication, our transport cost measure
ﬂuctuates signiﬁcantly across time, -38% on average between 1978 and 1993. This contrasts with
the physical distance often used in empirical trade studies. The reader may ﬁnd more details on
the way this cost is computed and some descriptive statistics on its components, variations across
time and impact on the French regional development patterns in Combes and Lafourcade (2001
and 2002).
9Results using GDP are available upon request.
10Since no intra-regional direct transport cost data exist for France, we estimate those. We
ﬁrst regress transport costs on real road distances and then apply estimated coeﬃcients to inter-
nal distances in order to get the corresponding internal transport costs. The internal distance
is obtained using a simple geographical approximation. Each region is approximated as a disk
upon which all production concentrates at the center and consumers are uniformly distributed
throughout a given proportion of the total area. We let this proportion vary in order to investi-
gate the impact of diﬀerent agglomeration patterns of consumers inside the regions. When the
consumers are located uniformly on the total area, we get dii = 0:376
p
A = 2
3R, where A is the
region area and R the corresponding radius if the region were a disk. When the consumers are
located uniformly on 1
16 of the total area surrounding the center, which better suits the observed




Production costs are approximated by the average wage per employee in the given year and
region, which is computed using surveys from the French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE).
The social network variables correspond to the number of people working in the destination
region who were born in the origin region (and the reverse). The business network variables
correspond to the number of plants located in the destination region belonging to a group which
has at least one other plant located in the origin region (and the reverse). The data needed for
construction of those latter variables are available only for 1993. Both types of network variables
are also computed using INSEE surveys.
Table 1 gives summary statistics for the data we use. The ﬁrst line clearly shows that inter-
regional trade ﬂows are much smaller than intra-regional ones, the former being on average equal
to less than 1% of the latter. Even the highest inter-regional trade ﬂow represents 86% of the
corresponding intra-regional ﬂow only. Inter-regional transport costs are on average much higher
(8.9 times) than intra-regional ones. This seems to be the most straightforward explanation for
the diﬀerences in inter- and intra-regional trade ﬂows. Indeed, the simple correlation between
these two variables is also high, equal to ¡0:38 (see Table 2). On average, the number of migrants
represents less than 2% of the number of people working in the region where they were born. There
are about 10 extremely high ﬁgures (above one) for this variable, which all correspond to people
who were born in a d´ epartement of the Parisian area and still work in in a d´ epartement this
area. The diﬀerence between the inter-regional plant connections and the intra ones is lower, the
ratio being around 1
3. These large gaps are a ﬁrst indication that networks could be important in
explaining the level of trade between regions. This is conﬁrmed by the strong positive correlations
(see Table 2) between network variables and the relative trade ﬂows, with a higher correlation
for social networks.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Sdt. Dev. Min Max
rel. ﬂows,
fij
fii 0.009 0.029 0 0.864
rel. transport costs,
tij
tii 8.914 4.035 1.073 23.602
rel. migration from origin,
sij
sii 0.013 0.043 0 1.154
rel. migration from destination,
sji
sii 0.019 0.172 0 8.812
rel. plant connections from origin,
bij
bii 0.277 0.151 0 0.833
rel. plant connections from destination,
bji
bii 0.373 0.411 0 7.333
Note: Statistics are computed on the observations where i 6= j:
11Table 2: Correlation matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
rel. ﬂows (1) 1 0.09* 0.01 -0.38* 0.49* 0.31* 0.10* 0.00
rel. production (2) 1 0.29* 0.06* -0.10* -0.03 -0.41* -0.36*
rel. wages (3) 1 0.02 -0.15* 0.04* -0.39* -0.52*
rel. transport costs (4) 1 -0.28* -0.12* -0.07* -0.03*
rel. migration from origin (5) 1 0.64* 0.28* 0.28*
rel. migration from destination (6) 1 0.08* 0.05*
rel. plant connections from origin (7) 1 0.73*
rel. plant connections from destination (8) 1
Note: * denotes signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at the 1%level.
Finally, we notice that social network variables are also highly correlated with the relative
transport cost. Figure 2 helps understanding this correlation and, more generally, the spatial
patterns of network variables. The left-hand side maps correspond to the social network variable
sij
sii and the right-hand side to the business one
bij
bii, in 1993. Each pair of maps corresponds to
one of the region of destination including the three largest French cities: Paris (top pair), Rhˆ one
(Lyon) (middle pair) and Bouches-du-Rhˆ one (Marseille) (bottom pair). For each map, the highest
class, for which the plotted variable is equal to 1, is drawn in black and only includes the region
to which the map refers, which allows to locate it.
The top left map shows that the number of migrants to Paris is larger from those regions
that are either not too far from Paris (North, North-West of France), or that are large even
if more remote (the d´ epartements hosting Bordeaux, Lyon, and Marseille for instance). This
gravity pattern also clearly emerges for Rhˆ one and Bouches-du-Rhˆ one. The eﬀect of distance is
strong again, and large regions as Paris or Nord appear as major sources of migrants. Regarding
business networks, the distance eﬀect is less striking. The impact of the size of the origin region,
however, is still clear, the spatial pattern of business network being quite similar independently
from the destination region. Levels change, however. This conclusion is conﬁrmed by the high
correlations between the business variables and the relative production for instance (see Table 2).
3 Results
3.1 Border eﬀects without network variables
We now proceed to the estimation of the two speciﬁcations derived from the theoretical model.
We begin with the odds speciﬁcation (15) that uses the bilateral trade ﬂows relative to the
trade with self as dependent variable. Table 3 presents the results of the odds speciﬁcation
without social nor business network variables. Our purpose here is to investigate the impact of
internal distance computation and contiguity variable inclusion on the estimated border eﬀect,
and choose a benchmark speciﬁcation used later for our main purpose, the assessment of the
impact of networks on trade.
For each year, estimations are computed with two deﬁnitions of the internal distance, one
assuming that consumers are uniformly located on the entire region area (columns (1)) and the
other on only 1
16 of this area (columns (2)). Column (3) tests the impact of the inclusion of the
contiguity variable.
In Table 3, the line “Total Border” gives the coeﬃcient used to calculate the total border
eﬀect: -2.24 in column 1978(2) for instance means that in 1978, inter-regional ﬂows between
12Figure 2: Relative number of Migrants, sij=sii (left) - Relative number of Plants Connections,
bij=bii (right), for Paris (top), Rhˆ one (middle) and Bouches-du-Rhˆ one (bottom), in 1993
13Table 3: Odds speciﬁcation - Aggregate - 1978 and 1993
Dependent Variable: ln(cij=cii)
Model : 1978(1) 1978(2) 1978(3) 1993(1) 1993(2) 1993(3)
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N 7935 7935 7935 7491 7491 7491
R
2 0.383 0.404 0.395 0.408 0.422 0.416
RMSE 1.591 1.564 1.575 1.536 1.518 1.526
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses with
a,
b and
c respectively denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels.
two non contiguous regions are exp(2:24) = 9:4 times lower than intra-regional ones. Column
1978(1) shows that the deﬁnition of the internal distance signiﬁcantly aﬀects the level of this
border eﬀect, a now well-established result (see Wei, 1996, and Helliwell and Verdier, 2001, for
instance). However, in the current paper, we are not primarily interested in this issue, but in the
way border eﬀects are aﬀected by networks. And indeed, we ﬁnd this impact to be very similar
across deﬁnitions of the internal distance chosen.
As expected, removing the contiguity variable decreases the border eﬀect which corresponds
now to the average ratio of intra-regional trade ﬂows over all inter-regional ﬂows. The contiguity
variable permits to distinguish between two diﬀerent kinds of border eﬀects. Indeed, apart from
the fact that inter-regional ﬂows between two non contiguous regions are 9:4 times stronger than
intra-regional ones, column 1978(2) also shows that inter-regional ﬂows between two contiguous
regions are exp(2:24¡1:06) = 3:2 times lower than intra-regional ones, while they are themselves
exp(1:06) = 2:9 times higher than those between two not contiguous regions. Thus, the total
border eﬀect can be decomposed as: 9:4 = 3:2 £ 2:9. By contrast, the estimation that does
not include the contiguity dummy (column 1978(3)) only shows that inter-regional ﬂows are on
average exp(1:20) = 3:3 times lower than intra-regional ones. Our central results concerning the
impact of networks are largely independent of whether we include a contiguity dummy or not.
Transport costs impede trade ﬂows, in the expected convex way. Using the assumption that
consumers are not spread over the whole area of the region makes both the transport cost coeﬃ-
cient stronger and the quadratic one more signiﬁcant (comparing columns 1978(2) and 1978(1)).
On the other hand, the transport cost coeﬃcients are simultaneously lower than those obtained
when the contiguity dummy variable is not included. Thus, the estimation corresponding to
columns 1978(2) leads to intermediate levels of both border and transport costs eﬀects. More-
over, the global quality of regressions is slightly higher under this assumption, the R2 being
14higher. We therefore choose to work with this “intermediate scenario” speciﬁcation, even if the
choice of the benchmark speciﬁcation is rather innocuous on our results. The network variable
eﬀects for 1978 in the next section is compared to the benchmark estimation corresponding to
column 1978(2).10
According to theory, the relative production coeﬃcient should be equal to 1. This not the
case here, as often in this kind of estimations. Even if the impact of the production value is a
bit low, it is still largely positive: Relative trade increases with the relative size of the trading
regions. Moreover, the derived border and transport eﬀects (which are the variables of primary
interest) are quite comparable whether the coeﬃcient on production is imposed to be unitary or
not. Finally, note that the estimates for the relative wages are also a bit low compared to what
theory predicts. This is also an usual result in the empirical literature estimating price elasticities
using trade ﬂows. Recent studies by Erkel-Rousse and Mirza (2002), Hanson (1998), Head and
Ries (2001) or Lai and Treﬂer (2002) for instance, ﬁnd higher estimates of ¾ but have to rely
on diﬀerent estimation techniques and/or diﬀerent type of data. Compared with existing studies
estimating price elasticities in a gravity-like equation, our levels for this parameter are actually
fairly high. Moreover, as will appear in the next section, introducing network eﬀects increases
this estimated value.
Similar comments can be drawn from the estimations on 1993 data. A noticeable diﬀerence
is that the level of the total border eﬀect drops from 9:4 in 1978 to exp(1:84) = 6:3 in 1993 in
the benchmark speciﬁcation. The local border eﬀect also decreases from 3:3 to 2:6. Those results
suggest a process of economic integration within France. Gradual integration is also observed
at the European level by Nitsch (2000) or Head and Mayer (2000) over the same period. Note
that this fall in border eﬀects comes in addition to the fall in our transport cost measure across
time (¡38% between 1978 and 1993). Last evidence of integration, we also observe a decrease
in the estimated transport cost coeﬃcient, simultaneously becoming more convex. The other
estimates, corresponding to coeﬃcients on relative production and wages, are stable across time.
The predictive power of the model is slightly higher in 1993.
An intermediary result is therefore that in 1993, intra-national administrative borders within
France seem to aﬀect trade with an impact of a magnitude similar to the one Wolf (2000) ﬁnds
for trade inside the United States in 1993.
We now turn to the estimation of the friction speciﬁcation given in equation (17). Table 7
gives the estimation for 1978 and 1993 (columns 1978(1) and 1993(1), respectively), without
network variables. Even if the model is now more constrained, all estimates are similar to the
benchmark odds speciﬁcation, for both years. Of primary interest, implied border eﬀects are
noticeably close. The total border eﬀect is equal to 10.1 in 1978 and to 6.9 in 1993 in the friction
speciﬁcation, and the contiguity eﬀects are exactly the same in the friction and the (benchmark)
odds speciﬁcations, for both years. The transport cost estimates are also very similar in both
estimations.
These consistent results can be viewed as robustness evidence, despite important diﬀerences in
the variables included in the regressions. This implies that possible mis-speciﬁcation or omitted
variable problems are likely to be of secondary importance in our results.
10We will have the same intermediate scenario speciﬁcation (contiguity included and smaller internal distance)
used as a benchmark for 1993.
153.2 Border eﬀects with network variables in the odds speciﬁcation
Our purpose is now to study the impact of business and social networks on border eﬀects. We ﬁrst
estimate diﬀerent variants of the odds speciﬁcation in order to isolate the social networks eﬀects
from the business ones. Results are given in Tables 4 and 5 for 1978 and 1993, respectively.
The only available network variable in 1978 is based on social network (migrations), whereas
business network variables can also be computed for 1993. For both tables, migration variables
are introduced one by one in columns (1) and (2). Column (3) gives the results when the two
migration variables are simultaneously introduced. Columns (4) to (6) in Table 5 proceed in the
same way for the business network variable in 1993. Column (7) presents the 1993 estimation
including all network variables.
Table 4: Odds speciﬁcation with network eﬀects - Aggregate - 1978
Dependent Variable: ln(cij=cii)
Model : (1) (2) (3)
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N 7935 7935 7935
R
2 0.424 0.432 0.433
RMSE 1.537 1.526 1.525




signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
One of the main conclusion to be drawn from those tables is that both network variables
have a strong negative impact on the estimated border eﬀects in the two years considered. The
reduction in the estimated border eﬀect reaches 62.6% in 1993 when all network variables are
considered. This is summarized in Table 6. The ﬁrst line in this table computes the total border
eﬀect variation implied by each estimation of the odds speciﬁcation. For instance, the ﬁrst ﬁgure
in this line means that when only the origin social network variable is introduced, the total border
eﬀect in 1978 varies by exp(1:81 ¡ 2:24) ¡ 1 = ¡35:0%, 2:24 and 1:81 being the estimate from
Table 3, column (2), and from Table 4, column (1), respectively. The other ﬁgures of the line are
similarly obtained with the other estimations.
When introduced simultaneously, social network variables have a strong impact on the total
border eﬀect which decreases by 44.5% and 56.3% in 1978 and 1993, respectively. When only one
social network variable is introduced, variations of comparable magnitude are obtained. Note also
that the eﬀect of migrations from destination are stronger than those from origin, both in 1978
and 1993. The origin eﬀect even loses statistical signiﬁcance when both variables are introduced
16Table 5: Odds speciﬁcation with network eﬀects - Aggregate - 1993
Dependent Variable: ln(cij=cii)
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
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N 7491 7491 7491 7491 7491 7491 7491
R
2 0.436 0.44 0.443 0.45 0.456 0.456 0.463
RMSE 1.5 1.495 1.49 1.482 1.473 1.473 1.464
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses with
a,
b and
c denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 6: Border, Transport Cost, and Network Eﬀect Variations (odds speciﬁcation)
Social Business Soc. & Bus.
Orig. Dest. Tot. Orig. Dest. Tot. Tot.
1978 1993 1978 1993 1978 1993 1993 1993 1993 1993
Border (variation, %) -35.0 -42.1 -43.4 -49.9 -44.5 -56.3 -38.3 -44.3 -45.0 -62.6
Transport (variation, %) -50.0 -49.7 -63.3 -57.8 -63.8 -64.4 -23.7 -28.1 -28.5 -58.7
Network (level) 2.9 3.7 4.5 5.2 4.7 7.3 2.5 3.6 3.6 9.4
17simultaneously in 1978, probably due to the fairly high correlation between the variables (see
Table 2), even if its sign is still correct. Both eﬀects are signiﬁcant in 1993 when simultaneously
introduced. Last, the implied border eﬀect reductions are stronger in 1993 than in 1978.
These are evidence that social networks matter in shaping trade ﬂows in a way that is largely
discontinuous and not proportional to distance, which explains a large part of the border eﬀect.
Moreover, this phenomenon increases over time and is stronger as regards the migrations from
destination than from origin. People now located in the origin region are more able to export to
the destination region because they know both the destination consumer’s preferences and the
local retailers for instance. The fact that people migrating in the reverse direction carry their
preferences to the destination region, thus increasing the imports from their origin region, has a
signiﬁcant but relatively smaller inﬂuence.
Business networks also play an important role in shaping trade and reducing border eﬀects.
It can be noticed in Table 5 that business networks variables exhibit a highly signiﬁcant positive
inﬂuence on bilateral trade. A 10% rise in this variable increases the ratio of bilateral trade to self
trade by values as high as 7%. When introduced separately, the origin business variable decreases
the total border eﬀect by 38.3%, the destination business one by 44.3%. Similarly to migrations,
the destination eﬀect is stronger. This is conﬁrmed by the fact that not only the level of estimates
is higher for the destination networks when both are introduced simultaneously, but the origin
eﬀect also becomes non signiﬁcant. As for social networks, both the local border eﬀect and the
contiguity one signiﬁcantly decrease, but the former in higher proportions.
When all network variables are introduced (in the 1993 regression), the total border eﬀect
is drastically reduced by 62.6%. Even if the origin eﬀect of both the social and the business
variable are not signiﬁcant in this regression, probably due to the correlations between variables
(see Table 2), all estimates have the correct sign. Moreover, the border eﬀect reduction is larger
than in any of the other estimations. Hence, we ﬁnd that 1) all variables separately aﬀects trade
2) their inﬂuences are at least partially orthogonal.
Our central focus is to measure the impact of networks on the border eﬀect puzzle, which
we have just presented. However, another striking conclusion stems from our estimations. Not
only does the discontinuous eﬀect of borders sharply drop when network variables are introduced,
but so does the impact of the transport cost. With the estimated coeﬃcients, the impact of the









(1 + tij)2 ¡ (1 + tii)2
i
: (18)
This eﬀect averages at 166.9 in 1978 and 123.4 in 1993, when network eﬀects are not con-
sidered. This means that the diﬀerence between inter-regional and intra-regional transport costs
causes, on average, inter-regional trade ﬂows to be 123.4 times lower than internal ones in 1993.
Thus, transport costs still largely impede trade, even when border eﬀects are taken into account.
Moreover, the impact of transport costs is on average much stronger than the impact of borders.
Next, the second line of Table 6 reports the variations of these transport cost impediments
when network eﬀects are introduced. Noticeably, the impact of the transport cost declines by
amounts of comparable magnitude to the border eﬀect reduction. For instance, when we introduce
both social network eﬀects (business ones, respectively), the decline is equal to 64.4% (28.5%,
respectively) in 1993. Moreover, transport cost are signiﬁcantly more inﬂuenced by social net-
works than by business networks, contrary to border eﬀects on which both eﬀects have the same
magnitude. For these reasons, and due to the correlation between network variables, the impact
of all the network variables simultaneously introduced appears to be slightly lower, -58.7%, than
18the one due to the social networks only. Finally, we once more observe that destination networks
have a stronger eﬀect on the impact of transport costs.
Thus, both the standard trade impediments (the impact of transport cost) and borders are
strongly reduced by networks. We infer that, thanks to their correlation with the network vari-
ables, these variables proxy for eﬀects others than physical cost or trade barriers, namely prefer-
ences or information costs, in basic gravity or border eﬀect estimations. When network variables
are introduced, border and transport cost variables capture a much less important share of the
preferences or information cost eﬀects, which is the reason why their impact decreases.
Besides, it is possible to compute the impact of networks on relative trade. This is reported






















The ﬁrst ﬁgure in the last line of Table 6 means that the diﬀerences across regions in the
migrants number relative to the people working in the region they are native from (the origin
social network variable) make, on average, the inter-regional trade ﬂows 2.9 times lower than the
internal ones in 1978 and 3.7 times in 1993. Both social network variables acting simultaneously
decrease inter-regional trade ﬂows by 4.7 times in 1978 and 7.3 times in 1993. The business eﬀects,
evaluated in 1993, makes the inter-regional trade ﬂows 3.6 times lower and, ﬁnally, all networks
eﬀects together make them 9.4 times lower than inter-regional ones. These ﬁgures clearly reﬂect
the large substitution of network eﬀects to transport cost and border ones in the explanation of
the inter-regional trade ﬂows.
3.3 Border eﬀects with network variables in the friction speciﬁcation
As a second step and in a robustness test purpose, we estimate for both years the corresponding
network eﬀects in the friction speciﬁcation, which is also computed industry by industry in the
second part of this section. The results of the friction regressions on aggregated data are given in
Table 7. As for the odds speciﬁcation, Table 8 reports the variations of the implied border and
transport cost eﬀects, and the corresponding level of network eﬀects.
The impact of networks in shaping trade ﬂows and reducing border eﬀect is even larger in
this speciﬁcation than in the odds one.
Border eﬀects are reduced by 52.6% in 1978 and 60.4% in 1993 using social networks alone.
Regarding the 1993 estimation, business networks alone have a higher eﬀect on trade ﬂows than
when the odds speciﬁcation is used. The implied reduction in the border eﬀect is similar to the
social networks, equal to 57.6%.
The total border eﬀect is reduced by 70.8% when both social and business network eﬀects are
considered. The remaining total border eﬀect in France in 1993 is equal to 2 (exp(0.7)). Although
this could seem to be still a large number for a country as integrated as France, it does not seem
totally unreasonable, and even looks very small compared to what is found in the literature.
Estimates of border eﬀects on international trade for the same period in Europe are between 10
and 15 (see Nitsch, 2000 and Head and Mayer, 2000 for instance). Inside the United States, Wolf
(1997, 2000) ﬁnds a baseline border eﬀect of 4.39, whereas Nitsch (2002) estimates in a recent
paper an intra-German border eﬀect of 2.2, very close to our ﬁnal ﬁgure. These residual border
eﬀects may be attributed to pure home preference bias as implied by our theoretical model. It is
also possible that “technical” questions raised by Anderson and van Wincoop (forthcoming) or
Head and Mayer (2002) contribute to a part of the remaining border eﬀect.
19Table 7: Friction speciﬁcation with network eﬀects - Aggregate - 1978-1993
Dependent Variable: ln(Φij)
Model : 1978(1) 1978(2) 1993(1) 1993(2) 1993(3) 1993(4)
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N 3709 3709 3413 3413 3413 3413
R
2 0.467 0.521 0.511 0.544 0.573 0.581
RMSE 1.249 1.185 1.182 1.141 1.105 1.094
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses with
a,
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c respectively denoting sig-
niﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 8: Border, Transport Cost, and Network Eﬀect Variations (friction speciﬁcation) (%)
Social Business Soc. & Bus.
1978 1993 1993 1993
Border (variation, %) -52.6 -60.4 -57.6 -70.8
Transport (variation, %) -76.2 -69.1 -27.9 -59.7
Network (level) 8.1 9.6 6.7 16.8
20The decrease of the transport cost impact is also striking, with the same feature than the
one observed in the odds estimations, the eﬀect of business network being smaller than the
social network one. All network variables together decrease the transport impact by 59.7%. The
corresponding network impact on relative trade ﬂow is signiﬁcantly larger than those obtained in
the odds estimation. The gap between the inter-regional social networks and the internal ones
causes the inter-regional trade ﬂows to be 8.1 times lower than the internal ones in 1978, 9.6
times in 1993, 6.7 times for the business networks alone and 16.8 times when all network eﬀect
are simultaneously introduced, in 1993.
Last, the improvement in the overall ﬁt of the regression when taking into account all network
variables is a further indication that those eﬀects are important in shaping trade volumes inside
France, which translates for instance into a rise of the R2 from 0.51 to 0.58 in 1993. Those
results can be summarized in a plot against the relative transport cost of two modiﬁed versions of
equation (17) where all right-hand side variables (with corresponding estimated coeﬃcients) are
passed on the left-hand side except for the intercept and the linear transport cost term. Figure 3,
in which circles (crosses, respectively) correspond to the friction speciﬁcation with (without,
respectively) network controls, sums up the main conclusions of our study.
Figure 3: Gravity predictions with and without network controls
ln rel. transport costs
 ln friction, network controls  Linear prediction
 ln friction  Linear prediction




Following the inclusion of network variables, we observe that: ( i) the regression line is higher
than the prediction without network controls, and crosses the vertical axis closer to the origin,
meaning that border eﬀects almost disappear, (ii) the slope with respect to transport also de-
creases in absolute value, meaning that the transport cost impact is reduced, (iii) points are less
dispersed around the regression line, meaning that the ﬁt of the regression globally improves.
Overall, sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 provide results that all point to a positive answer to the
question asked in the title of this paper. We now proceed to detailing that answer industry by
industry.
213.4 Border eﬀects by industry in the friction speciﬁcation
The level of aggregation of the data we use possibly masks the fact that diﬀerent industries
may be more or less aﬀected by border eﬀects. Furthermore it might be interesting, in terms of
economic implications, to determine whether the social and business eﬀects on trade are more or
less relevant depending on the industry. The same magnitude being obtained for border eﬀects
in the friction speciﬁcation as in the odds speciﬁcations, we use the former to investigate these
eﬀects for each industry separately. The friction speciﬁcation has the advantage that production
and wage variables are not needed, which is valuable as they are specially diﬃcult to obtain at
the industry level.
Tables 9 and 10 present the derived border eﬀects for each industry when controlling for social
networks only, in 1978 and 1993, respectively. The induced falls in trade impediments stemming
from this control are given in the right-hand side of the tables (columns “Var. Bord. (%)” and
“Var. Trans. (%)” for the border and the transport cost eﬀects, respectively). Column “Soc.”
gives the elasticity of the social network variable, and column “Bord.” the remaining total border
eﬀect. The last line of the table presents the average values stemming from the pooled estimation
on all industries. Table 11 gives the corresponding results when controlling for both social and
business networks in 1993.
Table 9: Friction speciﬁcation - Industries - Social networks - 1978










Wood and paper 1289 0.3
¤ 4.4
¤ -31.2 -63.3









Transport 431 0.1 1.9 -13.6 -34.9
Rubber products 159 0.1 4.8 -11.1 -23.4






¤ denotes signiﬁcance at the 5%level.
The pooled regression exhibits an average reduction of the total border eﬀect that amounts to
34.3% in 1978 and 47.5% in 1993 due to social networks, and 55.7% in 1993, due to the adding of
business controls. These are other evidence of the network role that increases over time despite the
French ongoing decrease in transport costs over the period. The average remaining total border
eﬀect, with a value of 2.7 in 1993, is low and quite similar to the one obtained on aggregated
data. The average elasticities of trade frictions with respect to social and business variables are
also comparable and always fairly high.
When performed on each industry separately, speciﬁc estimates by industry are obtained. In
Tables 9, 10, and 11 industries are ranked by decreasing impact of networks on the total border
eﬀect. The highest reductions in border eﬀects are obtained for the food related industries, namely
the food and beverage industry and agriculture. However, other industries such as chemicals or
extraction, steel, and construction also experience a fairly high reduction, despite the well known
high transport costs that ﬁrms bear for shipping these materials.11 The decrease in the transport
11Recall that the diﬀerences in transport costs sensitivity across goods arising from diﬀerent transportability for
22Table 10: Friction speciﬁcation - Industries - Social networks - 1993
Industry Obs. Soc. Bord. Var. Bord. (%) Var. Trans. (%)
Miscellaneous 1486 0.5










Extraction, steel, construction 1465 0.3
¤ 8.7
¤ -42.4 -54.6
Chemicals 611 0.2 5.0
¤ -31.5 -43.3
Textile and clothing 116 0.2 4.3
¤ -24.6 -25.7
Wood and paper 1192 0.1 3.5
¤ -16.7 -24.4
Transport 533 0.1 3.9
¤ -13.3 -20.8






¤ denotes signiﬁcance at the 5%level.
Table 11: Friction speciﬁcation - Industries - Social and Business networks - 1993
Industry Obs. Soc. Bus. Bord. Var. Bord. (%) Var. Trans. (%)
Miscellaneous 1486 0.4
¤ 0.5




Food and beverages 1669 0.2
¤ 0.4
¤ 1.4 -60.0 -49.2










Wood and paper 1192 0.1 0.2 3.3
¤ -21.4 -19.5
Transport 533 0.1 0.1 3.7
¤ -17.8 -18.7
Textile and clothing 116 0.6 -1.0 6.3
¤ 10.5 -79.4







¤ denotes signiﬁcance at the 5%level.
23cost eﬀect is often larger than the decrease in the border eﬀect. The ranking made according
to the strongest variation in transport cost eﬀect is the same as the one made according to the
strongest variation in the border eﬀect. As a conclusion, networks similarly aﬀect both kinds of
trade impediments, in all industries.
Only the lowest ranked industries in terms of border eﬀect variation may experience an in-
crease of the border eﬀect. However, those are industries in which network eﬀects are not signif-
icant, probably due to the small number of observations. This lack of observations also probably
explains why both network variables, which are moreover positively correlated, are not often
simultaneously signiﬁcant when both introduced in 1993.
Rankings are almost the same in all considered periods and whether business networks are also
considered or not. The textile and clothing industry (the rank of which signiﬁcantly increases)
and the wood and paper industry (for which it decreases) are two exceptions. Moreover, these
variations are reduced when business network eﬀects are also introduced. Therefore, diﬀerences
across industries regarding the impact of network eﬀect can be considered as fairly stable.
4 Conclusion
Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) present the border eﬀect on trade as a major puzzle to international
macroeconomics. The understanding of this puzzle has recently progressed in several directions.
Abstracting from methodological issues, those advances have mostly focused on providing expla-
nations for the large impact of political (international) borders.
The monetary union explanation, as any type of speciﬁcally international transaction costs
explanation like tariﬀ or non tariﬀ barriers, cannot however be the only reason why borders matter
in trade ﬂows. Indeed, as was ﬁrst shown by Wolf (1997, 2000), administrative (intra-national)
borders also seem to signiﬁcantly impede trade.
We tried in this paper to investigate an explanation for those intra-national border eﬀects:
If the existence of social and business networks promotes trade as emphasized by Rauch (2001),
this could explain the existence of border eﬀects inside a country as networks are presumably
much more dense and easier to maintain on short distances and therefore inside administrative
borders.
We have shown that intra-national administrative borders signiﬁcantly matter in trade pat-
terns inside France with an impact of the same order of magnitude that Wolf (2000) ﬁnds for
trade inside the United States. However, more than 60% of these intra-national border eﬀects
can be explained by the employment composition in terms of birth place (social networks) or by
inter-plants connections (business networks). The two types of networks taken separately make
the estimate of border eﬀects fall by around 50%. When controlling for both type of networks, a
French region is estimated to trade only twice more with itself than with a non adjacent region
of similar size and distance. Moreover, we have also shown that networks reduce the impact of
transport cost on inter-regional trade by an amount of comparable magnitude, around 60%. Last,
these eﬀects emerge in almost all industries, with slightly diﬀerent but stable intensities.
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